报告时间：2021年5月8日（星期六） 9:00-11:00

报告平台：腾讯会议（会议号：137 597 383）

报 告 人：郑兴（Hsing Kenneth Cheng）教授

工作单位：佛罗里达大学

举办单位：管理学院

报告简介：

Impact of Own Brand Product Introduction on Optimal Pricing Models for Platform and Incumbent Sellers Sales on the e-commerce platform in the United States have experienced explosive growth and are projected to surpass 740 billion in 2023. The expansion of the platform’s traditional role as a platform into an online marketplace and the introduction of its own brand products have stoked a huge fear among the incumbent sellers.  The platform’s unfair anti-competitive practice further aggravates the situation.  Consequently, politicians and regulators have proposed prohibiting platforms from introducing own brand product in order to protect the incumbent sellers. This study addresses two research questions of critical interest to both the policy makers and the incumbent sellers. First, is the platform’s introducing its own brand product always detrimental to the incumbent sellers?  Second, how effective is the proposed policy in terms of protecting the incumbent sellers? We examine the impact of the platform’s own brand intro- duction on the incumbent sellers under two prevailing sell-on and sell-to pricing contracts. We find that the proposed legislation “that prohibits platforms from both offering a marketplace for commerce and participating in that marketplace” does not have the desired outcome of helping the incumbent sellers. Instead, it forces the platform to adopt only the sell-to contract with own brand introduction that hurts the sellers under most market conditions. Interestingly, when the own brand introduction is banned under the sell-to contract, the incumbent sellers can be better off because the platform’s strategic reaction to the enforcement can lead to the best scenario for the incumbent sellers. If the ban is imposed on both the sell-on and sell-to contracts, the plat- form’s best response is to add another new brand competing with the incumbent sellers, which can also help the incumbent sellers, however, not as much as in the case of the enforcement only under the sell-to contract.

报告人简介：

郑兴教授(Hsing Kenneth Cheng)现任美国佛罗里达大学沃灵顿商学院终身教授及John B. Higdon杰出讲座教授，佛罗里达大学信息系统与运营管理系(Information System and Operation Management)系主任(2011-14, 2020至今)。研究方向为电子商务、互联网技术对软件开发和营销的影响、信息系统政策问题等方面。郑教授在线上买球软件开发策略和网络中立性方面的研究成果具有开创性意义，尤其有关软件盗版原因发表的一系列研究成果为企业伦理管理做出了突出贡献，发表论文“Toward a Profile of Student Piraters”成为Journal of Business Ethics创刊30周年以来发表4747篇论文中精选最优秀的49篇论文之一。据Google统计，截止2016年1月郑教授发表论文“The Debate on Net Neutrality – A Policy Perspective”被近152,000网站引用，同时被刊登在美国《商业周刊》并接受美国著名咨询杂志“计算机世界”的采访；发表论文“Estimating Social Influences from Social Networking Sites”獲得2015年国际顶级决策科学期刊Decision Sciences Journal最卓越貢獻论文獎。据国际信息系统协会研究(Association for Information Systems)，郑教授在信息系统三大顶级期刊发表数量排名上，2010年至2012年在全球信息系统领域最优秀的100名学者中名列第16位, 2016年至2020名列第32位。郑教授曽任国际顶级期刊Information Systems Research副主编,目前同时兼任国际顶级期刊Decision Sciences Journal和Journal of the Association for Information Systems的副主编及資深主編，并曾任运营管理顶级期刊Production and Operations Management特刊主编。曾经担任包括信息系统国际顶级会议INFORMS的程序委员会委员以及分会主席，以及2003、2012年度国际最重要的电子商务研讨会Workshop on E-Business的联合主席。